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Abstract
The idea of history as magistra vitae – a collection of good and bad examples – was a central 
topos of historical writing in the West from antiquity till the late eighteenth century. The 
idea has served a number of different ends, motivating advanced political theory as well as 
functioning as a mere saying. The article investigates two books of historical examples, written 
for pedagogical purposes addressing young boys, both explicitly produced with this aim in 
mind: Johannes Schefferus’ Memorabilium Sueticae gentis exemplorum liber singularis (1671) 
and Ove Malling’s Store og gode Handlinger af Danske, Norske og Holstenere (1777). They 
differ considerably from modern history books in not being structured chronologically but 
according to the virtues the histories are meant to illustrate. The article compares the books’ 
structure, tables of content, choice of virtues and introductory texts. The aim is to explore 
the tension between exemplarity and temporality in the two collections.
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1. Introduction
One eye of history is time; the other geography. These were staple phrases in 
early modern history textbooks, intended to teach schoolboys and students 
how to study history. Historical knowledge was important because history 
was understood as the relation of great and memorable deeds, passed on 
to us to be remembered and honoured, and to teach us by example how 
to be virtuous, good and happy. History was simply a large collection of 
memorable narratives able to work as magistra vitae, the teacher of life – as 
Cicero once had termed it (De Oratore II, 9). Reinhart Koselleck has pointed 
out that this remained the dominant topos of Western historical thought 
from antiquity to the late eighteenth century, though in reality embracing 
a large variety of ideas and notions, and could occur in advanced political 
theory as well as in simple textbooks of the kind to be investigated here 
(1985, 22). The reason why history could provide behavioural models was 
the belief that human nature was not subject to change. And the same was 
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true of virtue and vice, as well as the main challenges, problems and issues 
that humans were expected to confront. They remained largely unchanged, 
while political systems and dynasties correspondingly shifted and alternated, 
though never bringing with them anything fundamentally new. As pointed 
out by Koselleck, this was also the reason why history was usually designated 
in the plural, as histories. Without the idea of a ‘linear, historical time [that] 
promised to reveal higher meaning’ (Appleby, Hunt and Jacob 1994, 55), early 
modern historical understanding did not include an overarching, uniform 
and unifying temporal dimension that defined both historiography and the 
meaning of history. If the individual histories were parts of a larger pattern, 
it was that of a divine plan, not of sequential time (Schiffman 2011, 5-13).
Historical narratives could concern events and persons from the past. 
It was, however, not the past as such, or time and temporal processes of 
change, as in the modern understanding of history, that really mattered 
(Eriksen 2014). Describing this notion of history, J.D. Lyons has pointed 
out that ‘the past per se is not the primary value. Rather the authority of the 
past becomes the raw material for the corrective genius of the writer in his 
quest to influence the future conduct of the reader or audience’ (1989, 14). 
As the two eyes of history, time and space were necessary tools for a proper 
understanding of it, but they were not themselves integral parts of history. 
Together they rather made up the specific location where history took place. 
Chronology, defined as the calculation of the exact time of important events 
like the Creation or the Flood, even became an independent science in the 
early modern period. Another of its aims was to synchronize the bewildering 
inconsistencies between Christian and Egyptian or Chinese histories: the latter 
two claimed to date back to before Creation! Joseph Scaliger (1540-1609) 
and Isaac Newton (1643-1727) were among the leading agents of this once so 
ground-breaking science (Grafton 1983). More commonly, time or chronology 
was said to give history its shape and fixity (e.g. Holberg 1733, 45). Bossuet, 
in his well-known Discours sur l’ histoire universelle (1681), originally written 
for the education of the French Dauphin, declared knowledge of chronology 
to be indispensable to avoid major historical errors like representing ‘men 
under the law of Nature or under written law as they are under the law of 
the Gospel’ or speaking of the vanquished ‘Persians under Alexander as of 
the victorious Persians under Cyrus’. Students who do not know when the 
historical events had taken place ‘will make the Greeks as free at the time 
of Philip as at the time of Themistocles or Miltiades’ (1961, 666).1 In short, 
chronological confusion created the worst kind of historical errors, for it 
prevented students from understanding the true meaning of what they learned.
This leaves a paradox. On the one hand, history illustrated never-
changing virtues and vices. It told stories about great and good deeds which 
1 All translations are mine.
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should be admired and emulated independent of time, and about values 
and principles which were more fundamental than any shifting modes of 
human life and not determined by any princely whim. On the other hand, 
histories got their form, their fixity and their true meaning from their 
location in time. Without knowledge about this, they could not be properly 
understood, not ‘seen’ as they really were. In actual history writing, both 
these dimensions would have to be handled. For how could history be fixed 
in time and circumstance and at the same time be exemplary, which meant 
reaching beyond its own immediate context? The present article will explore 
how this tension between exemplarity and temporality was handled in two 
specific cases. It will investigate two historical textbooks, written for boys and 
young men, published in the Nordic countries and quite widely read there. 
Textbooks of this kind do not represent ‘cutting edge’ historical research or 
philosophy. They are sources for cultural rather than intellectual history. What 
makes them interesting is that they provide excellent access to the simple 
truths, commonplaces and general ideas in early modern historical thinking 
and writing. They spell out basic premises and explain things that would be 
taken for granted in works addressing more advanced readers. They can be 
taken to present basic historical knowledge, truths that are held to be beyond 
dispute, and ideas that basically go unchallenged. In this way, the textbooks 
do not merely represent a didactic tradition, but are also valuable sources to 
an understanding of how the magistra vitae topos was set to work culturally. 
The books were published hundred years apart, but share a number of 
common features. The aim of comparing them is to investigate how two works 
that belong to the same tradition, inspired by very similar ideas about history 
and employing the same generic conventions, nonetheless can also differ from 
each other in the way they engage with the relation between temporality 
and exemplarity. Despite their shared ideas about the use and usefulness of 
history as magistra vitae, their conceptualizations of the conditioning frames 
of human existence appear to be different.
2. Two Nordic Textbooks
Johannes Schefferus composed his Memorabilium Sueticae gentis exemplorum 
liber singularis at the University of Uppsala, Sweden, in 1671. It was translated 
into Swedish in 1733, with the title En bok om det svenska folkets minnesvärda 
exempel (A Book about the Memorable Examples of the Swedish People).2 The 
Dane Ove Malling published his collection Store og gode Handlinger af 
Danske, Norske og Holstenere (Great and Good Deeds by Danes, Norwegians 
and Holsteinians) in Copenhagen in 1777.3 Both books were produced with 
2 A modern edition appeared in 2005. All references are to this edition (Schefferus 2005). 
3 The most recent edition dates from 1992. All references are to this edition (Malling 1992).
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explicitly educational aims. Schefferus, professor skytteanus in rhetoric, law 
and political thought, used the work very actively in his own teaching. His 
Chair had been established in 1622 as a direct response to the king’s desire 
for competent government officers. The university had traditionally educated 
the clergy, but a growing state administration now created the need for 
young aristocrats to be trained in the arts of law, rhetoric and administration 
(Landgren 2008, 287 ff; Savin 2008). 
The ambitious young author Ove Malling was given the task of producing 
a historical textbook by Ove Høegh-Guldberg, perhaps the country’s most 
powerful man during the reign of the insane king Christian VII. He had 
initiated a reform of the Latin-school system in 1775, as well as a new law of 
1776 which demanded that all civil servants be born within the realm. Together 
these novelties created the need for an education that fostered patriotism and 
knowledge of the history of the fatherland, and at the same time gave the pupils 
– as future civil servants – a good command of their mother tongue (Eriksen 
1999). Malling’s book was commissioned to answer these educational needs. 
The book met with huge success far beyond the educational system, and saw a 
number of new editions during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It was 
also translated into German (1779), French (1794) and English (1807 and 1822).
The fact that both books are composed with educational aims does not 
only imply that they are written for young boys rather than learned men, and 
thus expected to contain less complicated arguments and discuss less specialized 
issues in a less complex language. It also means that both books are explicitly 
oriented towards the future. History is intended to be the teacher of life in a very 
direct and even instrumental way, not only shaping the young boys as persons, 
but also supplying them with the tools they would need to enter government, 
state administration or, more generally, take part in civil life as truly patriotic 
citizens. The two books are both organized as collections of short narratives. 
They do not seek to explain the processes of change over time, or show the 
development of society or any of its institutions, for instance. Chronology is 
mainly an ordering principle and has little explanatory value of its own. The 
books present histories rather than history, examples intended to teach young 
people how to master future challenges aided by past experience. 
Koselleck describes the relation between past experience and future 
challenges, which according to him stood at the core of the magistra vitae 
notion of history, by the two terms space of experience and horizon of expectation. 
His point is that in traditional and early modern society, these two spheres or 
dimensions were largely identical – there were few ideas that the future would 
bring situations or phenomena that the past had not already experienced. Hence, 
this experience, collective and accumulated, would be adequate to handle even 
future situations. Moreover, expectations towards the future would not exceed 
the limits set by past experience. This high degree of identity between the 
already experienced and the not yet lived was what made it sensible to think 
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of history as magistra vitae – the histories represented accumulated experience 
of past generations living in the same social and mental universe as the present 
or future ones. When the magistra vitae topos started to dissolve during the 
latter part of the eighteenth century, this was due to the fact that rapid social 
and cultural change, together with a new and genuinely historical notion of 
temporality, created a gap between the space of experience and the horizon of 
expectation (Koselleck 1985, 267 ff). This makes it probable that the differences 
between the two books are due to the nearly one hundred years that separate 
them, rather than the fact that they present two different – and antagonistic – 
‘fatherlands’. Though both build on the overall idea of history as a collection 
of useful and exemplary histories, they also represent two historically different 
ways of putting this idea into pedagogical practice. As we shall see, the frames 
of exemplarity as well of those of human existence are presented in different 
ways in Sweden in 1671 and in Denmark in 1777 respectively.
3. A Tradition of Exemplary Narrative
The two collections are thematically, not chronologically, organized, which 
makes them differ considerably from modern history books. To this impression 
of strangeness is added the authors’ insistence that historical knowledge is 
relevant for the present and the future: the narratives are being presented 
because of their usefulness as models rather than as explanation of how past 
events or developments shape present situations. The location of the narratives 
– the past – is not described as something preceding the present, but rather as 
a close parallel to it.
The stories of each book are taken from the author’s (and potential 
readers’) own country, defined by the borders of each kingdom at the time 
of the books’ publication. The two authors both present this as a significant 
feature of their respective work. Patriotic education was an integral part of the 
task Malling had taken on when writing his book, and part of the commission 
he received from Høegh-Guldberg. He also chose to emphasize the patriotic 
dimension in his introduction, saying that examples taken from other nations 
would be ‘less important and less inviting for Danes and Norwegians’. The 
important advantage of domestic examples is that ‘we experience more by 
reading and thinking about them because they are our own’.4 Schefferus, 
for his part, is emphatic that ‘for it is certainly so that we are more deeply 
impressed by examples from our own fatherland, examples that we so to speak 
have received as inheritance’.5
4 In Danish, ‘Vi føle endnu meere ved at læse og tænke om den, fordi de ere vore egne’ 
(1992, 21).
5 In Swedish, ‘Vi påverkas nämligen starkare och mer på djupet av exempel från vårt 
fädernesland, sådana som vi så att säga erhållit i arv’ (2005, 35).
anne eriksen188 
In both cases these declarations are the result of an explicit break with 
established tradition. Through the centuries European schoolboys and 
students had read and learnt from the histories and exemplary rhetoric of 
Valerius Maximus’ Factorum ac dictorum memorabilium libri IX, a collection 
of nine ‘books’ containing about one thousand histories and anecdotes taken 
from Cicero, Livy, Varro and other classical writers. The book occupied a 
central position in Schefferus’ own teaching in Uppsala. He dealt with it 
during his lectures, and his students were given the task of defending or 
attacking its various examples and points, learning to know both the historical 
exempla and the rhetoric employed in historical argumentation (Johannesson 
2005, xv; see also Savin 2008, 244). His own book thus represented a direct 
continuation of this tradition – by introducing Swedish examples and arguing 
for their greater efficacy and value – as well as a contrast to it.
Malling’s approach to the same tradition is more nonchalant. In his 
introduction he says that ‘there are certainly some who have collected this 
kind of deeds before. Valerius Maximus made a draft’.6 Considering both 
the size and very durable influence of Valerius Maximus’ work, these words 
seem somewhat condescending. They probably reflect Malling’s ambitions as 
a writer as well as his position as a young man without teaching experience 
comparable to that of Schefferus. In spite of these differences between the two 
authors, their references to Valerius Maximus and the tradition of classical 
exempla in the teaching of history serves as an important framework to 
their own collections. Both authors acknowledge their place in this ancient 
tradition. By situating themselves in it, they both build on the authority that 
it represents while at the same time declaring that they present something 
that is new, different and better – though not too dissimilar.
The actual differences between the two books and that of Valerius 
Maximus are small, and certainly smaller than the two authors first indicate. 
Neither Schefferus nor Malling argued against the value of classical history 
as ‘teacher of life’. Their expressed reason for wanting to substitute classical 
examples with Nordic ones was not that the former were too old or came 
from a historical context that was strange to the Nordic world. Nor did they 
claim the need for more recent examples. Temporal distance was not seen as a 
problem. They simply pointed out that examples from ‘our own’ people worked 
better when patriotism was the issue, because they encouraged identification 
and made a deeper emotional impression. However, even Valerius Maximus 
had given the most attention to examples from his own domestic Roman 
context. Narratives concerning for instance Athens or Sparta were singled out 
as ‘external’ in his work. It can thus be argued that the argument presented in 
6 In Danish, ‘Vel er der nogle, som før mig have samlet saadanne Handlinger. Valerius 
Maximus har giort et Udkast dertil’ (1992, 20).
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the two books – the efficacy of domestic examples – had already been claimed 
by Valerius Maximus. The difference rather consisted in where and what the 
‘local’ or domestic actually was: the Northern world of Schefferus and Malling 
versus the Roman world of Valerius Maximus. The relation between these 
two locations, as seen in the period, was not merely a matter of geography, 
nor one of historical time. The Nordic and classical worlds simply occupied 
very different positions on what can be imagined as a ‘ladder of exemplarity’. 
The latter reigned at the top. In early modern European culture the classical 
world constituted far more than a specific time and place; it represented the 
very embodiment of exemplarity. The Nordic world was close to the bottom 
end of the ladder. Situated beyond even the farthest reach of Greek culture 
and the Roman empire, the cold and wild Northern countries were little more 
than the dark contrast to classical exemplarity. What Schefferus and Malling 
had to address when presenting their books was thus not the temporal or 
geographical distance between classical examples and the life-world of their 
students, but the lack of recognized exemplarity of the Nordic world.
Faithful to the tradition of Valerius Maximus, both Schefferus and Malling 
arranged their collections according to the virtues or moral qualities that the 
narratives are meant to illustrate. Seen in isolation the tables of contents in both 
books look like lists of desirable qualities attached to ways of acting. Closer 
investigation will nonetheless show that these lists are composed according to 
somewhat different principles. Even if (some of) the same virtues occur in both 
books and thus on both lists, they also represent different ways of thinking about 
the meaning of the virtues and the overall network of configuration that they are 
part of. Of particular interest in the present context is that none of these networks 
are defined through time or temporality. Taken as a whole, Malling’s choice of 
chapters and way of structuring them seems to aim at constructing an autonomous 
system of mutually constitutive ‘human and civic virtues’ – a kind of Linnaean 
taxonomy of virtues. Schefferus, for his part, instead, presents a universe filled 
with signs and references, in which ‘deeds’, events and phenomena in the secular 
world are related to cosmic powers and a divine will.
4. Structure and Overall Content in the Two Books
Commenting on the chapters in his own book, Malling points to a 
methodological challenge that he encountered during his work: ‘The 
categorization of the deeds into their classes has been difficult. Several 
deeds can be considered under more than one aspect, and several virtues 
are so closely related that it at times remains ambiguous where it belongs’.7 
7 In Danish, ‘Handlingernes Inddeling under visse Classer har havt sine Vanskeligheder. 
Mange Handlinger kan betragtes fra forskiellige Sider, og mange Dyder grændse saa tæt 
sammen, at det undertiden bliver tvetydigt at bestemme en dydig Handling sit Sted’ (1992, 21).
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He has nonetheless stuck to a method of categorization that is determined 
by the order of the book itself. Each and every ‘human and civic virtue’ 
will be better understood when they are illuminated through a selection of 
examples, he claims. The musings over ‘order’ and the division into ‘classes’ 
reflect typical Enlightenment systems. Malling appears as a veritable Linnaeus 
of virtues when he presents his ‘deeds’ as specimens of this or that class, 
and introduces each class with short descriptions of its main features. This 
approach creates a neat order, but it is also what makes the overlap between 
the ‘classes’ problematic. The species of a well-ordered system should be clearly 
distinguished from each other by mutually exclusive properties.
Malling also explained why his presentation of the narratives (or 
specimens) within each class was not chronological. His main aim, he 
declared, had been to make the book enjoyable to the reader and to secure 
variation. A chronological arrangement would inevitably let all the ‘best’ 
examples come first, and the ‘weakest’ towards the end – which was not to 
be recommended (1992, 23). The explanation makes it very clear that time 
and chronology had no independent value in this kind of historical narrative. 
Compared with the argument over the problem of classes, it also becomes 
clear that chronology is not part of the intrinsic ‘order’ of histories in the 
same way as the classes of deeds and virtues are. Chronology – or lack of 
it – had to do with the presentation of histories, with the question of how 
the examples were to be organized to make the most durable impression on 
readers and best keep their attention. In addition to this, Malling’s worries 
about the effects of a strictly chronological order of narratives illustrates that 
to him it was an obvious fact that the ‘best’ examples and greatest deeds 
belonged in the most remote past. The greatest authority and highest value 
resides in the past.
Schefferus presented no corresponding introductory ref lections 
concerning his own chapters and used no particular terminology to describe 
them. And even if his table of contents looks like a list of virtues, his way of 
arranging them was different. The chapters in Schefferus’ book refer instead 
to a more ancient mental universe. What defines the virtues in this case is 
not their respective places in a system of contrasting identities, but rather 
their relations to powers beyond human existence and outside the secular 
world. In Schefferus the virtues refer to eternity. Moreover, the narratives 
about virtues and great deeds are framed by stories that describe events and 
phenomena rather than human action, and which present powers and forces 
outside the human sphere of influence.
In his introduction to the modern edition of Schefferus, the literary critic 
Kurt Johannesson points out that most of the book is centred upon the four 
cardinal or ‘natural’ virtues: prudentia, justitia, fortitudo and temperantia, 
each of them presented over a number of chapters. He also underscores the 
significance of the first chapters, which are about religion, signs, omens, 
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and dreams. These stories are important because they speak about the signs 
by which the will of God can be known. Johannesson describes the final 
chapters as representing a ‘variety of themes’, like friendship, matrimonial 
love, the people’s loyalty to their kings and the kings’ love for their people. 
There are also chapters about patriotism, eloquence, physical force, luck, and 
persons who have been saved from great dangers and strange events, who 
have had an extraordinarily long life, or have died in unusual ways (2003, 
xviii). The echo of Valerius Maximus is easily heard here. Even his work has 
an introductory part about signs and omens, which indicates that such stories 
not only have their base in Christian seventeenth-century Sweden, but also 
reflect far more ancient ideas and mentalities. Stories about friendship, love, 
eloquence, and so on are likewise found in his collection. I would however 
argue that the arrangement of these narratives in Schefferus’ work is less 
random than indicated by Johannesson. The chapters that present what he 
refers to as a ‘variety’ of themes, and which might look like a catalogue of 
strange episodes, do likewise show more of a pattern.
In the five chapters that follow the ones about cardinal virtues, different 
aspects of love and friendship are presented: love between spouses, loyalty 
to the king, friendship among equals, and the allegiance of soldiers. Setting 
aside modern ideas about love and friendship as belonging to the sphere of 
romantic emotion and sentiment makes it easier to see the qualities described 
in the stories as important parts of social structure. They regulate relations 
between individuals not only ethically but also structurally. Friendship and 
love represent social bonds that carry with them specific rights and obligations. 
Only rarely does this concern relations between social equals, most often it is 
a question of rights and duties within a hierarchy. Qualities like friendship, 
fidelity, loyalty and allegiance thus have no stable meanings, but depend on 
perspective and position within the hierarchy: a king’s love for his subjects 
differs from that of his subjects for him. The exemplary narratives describe how 
friendship, fidelity, and love are practised in a number of different contexts, 
working as a performance of social roles and social structure. They also make 
it clear that virtue is not only about morals or personal obligation, but is also 
a matter of social competence.
After these stories follow two chapters on eloquence and physical 
strength respectively. The combination is less random than might appear at 
first sight. Eloquence is about the capacity of expressing one’s ideas with force 
and persuasion, in such a way that they impress and move an audience. The 
Oxford English Dictionary defines eloquence as ‘The action, practice, or art of 
expressing thought with fluency, force, and appropriateness, so as to appeal to 
the reason or move the feelings’ (OED, s.v. eloquence). The definition makes 
it clear that both chapters are about aspects of human force and capability 
of winning one’s way. Schefferus himself presents the two chapters and the 
relation between them as follows:
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So far we have presented virtues. We will now proceed to describe some tools by 
which the virtues may conquer. If any such tool is to be mentioned, it must be 
eloquence. For what tenable results can wisdom accomplish without its aid? ... To 
achieve something one also has no little help even from one’s physical strength. 
For even if those who aim at accomplishing something admirable and great have 
a particular need for the faculties of their soul, they will reach no longer than half 
the way towards the goal without the assistance of physical force.8
While the virtues work as a normative framework of human activity, linguistic 
and physical power are decisive for individual agency and success.
The final part of the book has five chapters that each present stories about 
changing luck, and two about unusual deaths and extraordinarily long lives. 
Taken as a whole, the structure of the book provides an image of the human 
condition. In our modern – and thus anachronistic – terms, it can be said to 
present an understanding of the relationship between social structure and the 
individual. The book discusses issues like the limitation of individual agency, 
gives advice for human behaviour and presents the cosmic powers that fix 
the conditions of human life on earth. Schefferus’ table of contents makes it 
clear that human life unfolds in the span between virtue and fate, between 
virtue and fortune or luck. The human task is to strive towards a virtuous life, 
the human vocation is to fulfil the ideals set by the virtues by means of the 
physical strength and mental faculties which one has been given. However, 
life is also governed by other conditions, over which humans have no power 
and can do nothing to change, but which may easily turn their existence 
upside down. Signs, omens, and dreams are thus highly important and may 
refer both to the will of God and to a predestined fate. In any case, they give 
glimpses into the realm of powers and cosmic connections that humans are 
subjected to, but over which they have no influence. The same applies to the 
changes of fortune – even they are excluded from human manipulations. The 
last chapters in the book describe individuals who have miraculously escaped 
great dangers, and tell stories about others who have won great fame in spite 
of a modest origin. In this way, even the individual’s most earnest attempts of 
living a life in accordance with the virtues and with one’s place in society are 
quite literally framed by determining forces and conditions. The message that 
can be read out of the book’s structure seems to be that no matter how much 
one strives towards a deserving and virtuous life, and no matter what mental 
8 In Swedish, ‘Vi har hittills behandlat dygder och skall nu övergå till att berätta om 
några redskap, med vars hjälp dygderna kan vinna sina syften. Om något av dessa redskap 
här skall nämnas, så är det vältaligheten. Ty hvilka hållbara resultat kan väl klokheten 
nå utan dess hjälp? ... För att utföra något har man ofta en icke ringa hjälp också av sina 
kroppskrafter. Ty även om de som försöker åstadkomma något berömvärt och lysande har 
en särskild användning för sin själsstyrka, kan denna likväl ofta inte komma längre än 
halvvägs, när den verkar utan bistand av kroppskrafterna’ (2005, 221, 227).
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and physical gifts one has been given, a human being can never conquer fate, 
escape chance, or defeat the will of God.
The ideas about this tension or span between virtue and fate reach back to 
Antiquity, and can be followed in European culture through the centuries. The 
Roman goddess of fortune and fate, above all known for her changing nature, 
was traditionally depicted with a wheel or standing on a ball. In Il principe 
(1532), Machiavelli writes that fortune determines half of what happens in the 
world, while human will answers for the rest (2007, 141). Art historian Rudolf 
Wittkower has traced the iconographical tradition of representing virtue and fate 
from antiquity to the seventeenth century, while philologist Marianne Pade has 
investigated the relation between virtue and fate in early modern translations of 
Plutarch (Wittkower 1938; Pade 2007). Kristiina Savin has investigated early 
modern notions of fortune, risk, and luck in a more specific Swedish context, 
regarding them as elements in a cultural repertoire. She points out that in this 
period luck – or happiness – was not considered to represent an emotional 
state, but refer to ‘the sum of several social and economic factors which in 
the Latin literature were called the gifts of fortune (bona fortunae). From this 
perspective, fortune is not merely a subjective apprehension, but represents an 
objectively given external reality’ (2011, 64). She consequently points out that 
even if fortune was an individual experience, it could be observed and evaluated 
from an external standpoint. The criteria for lucky events, a fortunate career, 
or a good life could be determined independently of the individual’s emotional 
experience. Shifts between good luck and bad luck were likewise understood 
in terms of changes in an external world (67).
The pattern that can be read out of Schefferus’ book is inscribed in a 
tradition which is just as ancient as the idea of history as the teacher of life. 
In Schefferus the signs and omens point towards the will of an all-powerful 
Christian God, in the same way as the ‘natural virtues’ are supplemented by 
His grace, but the principles and the structure from the classical tradition 
are nonetheless still intact. The individual stories – the examples – in 
Schefferus also carry a message that reaches beyond the stories themselves 
and the qualities that each of them is meant to illustrate. The stories make 
up a large and comprehensive image that not only presents the right ways 
to conduct oneself in order to live a good and deserving life, but which also 
serves as a kind of cosmic map of the forces that actually govern human life 
and to which humans are subjected. What defines and delimits qualities 
and virtues and what determines human agency is above all their relative 
positions within this larger image of cosmic forces and conditions. The lack 
of definitions and ‘classes’ in Schefferus compared with Malling is therefore 
not due to a lack of system or clear thought, but caused by the fact that the 
order of virtue in Schefferus is different. In his book, human life is presented 
as part of an eternal cosmic drama where virtues never change, but fortunes 
always do. In this universe the hand of God can be detected everywhere. 
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The ‘structural conditions’ of human life are not human-made, and their 
stability is not of this world. In such a context, histories are also examples of 
how eternity makes itself present in the secular world. The histories that take 
place in the secular world, defined by all its particularities of time and place, 
are merely superficial or accidental manifestations of these stable, cosmic and 
unchanging forces. Histories need time and location to take place, but not 
to acquire their deeper meaning.
5. Defining the Virtues
The introductory texts in both books serve to describe the virtues or events 
that will be presented and to relate the various stories to each other. Schefferus’ 
texts are generally very short and work to entangle the virtues and qualities in 
a kind of network or complex pattern. In his description of eloquence (quoted 
above) Schefferus underscores that wisdom cannot do without it, and goes 
on to say that even courage needs the encouragement of eloquence. It also 
supplies justice, goodness, and temperance with beauty and pleasure (2005, 
221). Wisdom, for its part, is said to have its source in piety, while justice 
stops it from becoming sly. Strength supports justice, while mildness prevents 
it from becoming hard. Courage in war has its parallels in mental strength 
and a strong character in civil contexts. In opposition to Malling, Schefferus 
does not regard it as a problem that the virtues overlap. He underscores 
connections, mutual references, shades and gradual change. The overall image 
that he presents demonstrates how all human existence and all secular life 
have one common source: the will and plan of God.
To the general description of each virtue, Schefferus often adds how the 
Swedes excel in it, either above other nations or on a par with them. About 
political cunning, defined as a subtype of wisdom, he says that:
Wisdom moves along different paths, some of which deviate from the common lane 
and may be used in an emergency, so that a goal may be reached more swiftly and 
easily, which only with great risk could be achieved if following the beaten track. For 
it does happen that the masses are so ignorant or so stubbornly indifferent to their 
own best that one has to dupe them to reach a good outcome. To plan this kind of 
cunning and employ it with success has therefore been an important concern for 
men who are experienced in public affairs and love the common good. Not even 
Sweden has been lacking in men who are well skilled in this art.9
9 In Swedish, ‘Klokheten rör sig ibland på vägar, som något avvikar från den allmänt 
upptrampade och som den utnyttjar i nödlägen för att snabbare och lättare uppnå syften, 
som den endast under stor risk skulle kunna uppnå, om den höll sig till den vanliga vägen. 
Ty allt emellanåt är massan så farligt ovetande och envist likgiltig till och med för sitt eget 
bästa, att man måste överlista den för att föra den till det målet. Att uttänka detta slags list 
och tillämpa den med framgång har därför alltid varit en viktig angelägenhet för män med 
time and exemplarity 195 
Only a minor part of the introduction (quoted in its entirety here) really seeks 
to define this particular type of wisdom. The main concern of the text is to 
explain how it works and in what situations it is necessary. It is also important 
to spell out who the agents are that possess this kind of skill and have the 
responsibility and right to make use of cunning. The Swedish nation has fostered 
many men with these capabilities, but Schefferus also underscores that the right 
to use cunning is far from general or common. It belongs exclusively to men 
in certain positions and with public responsibilities. In this way Schefferus 
presents an understanding of the Swedish nation or people that is different 
from the modern one. The Swedish nation is not the population at large, but 
neither is it an ethnic and cultural group, as in the typical nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century understanding of nations and nationalism. To Schefferus, 
the Swedish ‘people’, to whom his book title also refers, are the persons about 
whom and for whom he writes: the nobility and the sons of nobility, those who 
govern the country or are learning to govern it. The histories – the examples 
– are about them, and for them. They are the ones who are supposed to learn 
from history, and they are also the ones concerned by it. History is not about 
the common people. This does not mean that they are absolutely excluded from 
it. Schefferus presents narratives about a peasant so strong that he could lift a 
horse, and about a man who was trapped in a deep mine at Falun but succeeded 
in cutting his way through the obstructing rock by means of a small knife. It is 
nonetheless obvious that such episodes belong to history merely because of their 
extraordinary content. Events and episodes that belong to history proper only 
very rarely concern common people. Their lives are mostly spent outside history.
Malling’s introductions are more extensive than those of Schefferus. They 
all share a common structure and start with an explanation or definition. 
‘Brave courage’ may serve as an example. Malling explains that:
There are situations in life when great difficulties present themselves to us; there are 
others when we will meet unsought dangers, at times unavoidable ones, which defy 
us so that we will be forced to counter them. The weak man will fear, the timid will 
yield, give in, submit, or fly. The brave man however remains determined, and dares 
in such moments both to think and speak, dares to ask for remedies against danger, 
dares to grab for it even if it is the only possible way, dares to execute it, everything 
with the hope of success and without fear for himself.10
erfarenhet av offentliga värv och med kärlek till det allmännas bästa. Inte heller i Sveriges 
folk har det saknats män som behärskat denna konst’ (2005, 70).
10 In Danish, ‘Der ere Tilfælde i livet, hvor store Vanskeligheder lægges os i Veien: der ere 
andre, hvor Farer, undertiden uundgaaelige Farer, møde os, uden at vi søge dem, eller trodse os 
der, hvor vi ere forbundne til at gaae dem i Møde. Her frygter den svage, den forsagte: han bøier 
sig, giver efter, ligger under, eller flyer. Den kiekke derimod staaer fast, tør i disse Øieblikke baade 
tænke og tale, tør spørge om middel mod Faren, tør gribe det, om der endog kun er et eeneste 
mueligt, tør sætte det i verk; alt i Haab om godt Udfald og uden Skræk for sig selv’ (1992, 174).
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The virtue or quality is thus explained by the means of action carried out 
in a specific context. Malling describes to his reader what the brave person 
does. In the quote above we are first told what the weak and timid person 
would do, then follows the direct contrast: the actions of the brave individual. 
After this, the text follows the same patterns of contrast in explaining the 
difference between the virtue in question and the other ways of acting that 
only apparently are good or virtuous. In this way, and unlike Schefferus, 
Malling does not describe shades and gradual difference, but simply contrasts. 
The text about courage goes on thus:
Some believe themselves to be brave just because they have hardened themselves to 
defy danger, to run blindly against it, without any other intention than running, 
and without considering whether it will bring them honour or shame or whether 
they were called upon to act. This is not true courage. This is only wantonness, 
forwardness, or rage.11
In similar ways the smart is distinguished from the forward, the just from the 
unrelenting, and the wise from the cunning. The explanations are constructed 
over such oppositions, making each good quality stand out through the 
contrast with the bad. The same method is employed to distinguish between 
different good qualities, even if this is more problematic. In his efforts to draw 
the line between perseverance and courage, Malling returns to the problem of 
overlap, and concludes that these two qualities have some common features. 
He still insists on relevant differences:
Courage alone is a glow that flares up when it is nourished, but at times will fade 
away when nourishment is lacking or decreasing. Perseverance is a steadily burning 
fire which is continually nourished and which spreads an evenly maintained warmth 
in the breast.12
The selection of virtues and deeds is also different in Malling. His choice 
does not reflect the traditional cardinal virtues. Neither does he present the 
tension between virtue and fortune. His ‘great and good deeds’ can be divided 
into four main categories. The first section of his book is about man’s relation 
to God. Then follow two chapters about the king and the fatherland. After 
11 In Danish, ‘Nogle have troet sig modige, fordi de have hærdet sig til at trodse, til at 
løbe blindt mod Farer, uden anden Hensigt, end at løbe mod dem, og uden at see paa, om 
der var ære eller Skam ved at vove, om de havde Kald dertil eller ei. Dette er ei det sande. 
Det er kun kaadhed, eller Fremfusenhed, eller Raserie’ (1992, 174).
12 In Danish, ‘Mod aleene er en Lue, der blusser saa tit den oppustes og faaer Næring; 
men falder undertiden, fordi Næringen dæmpes, eller tager af. Standhaftighed er en 
jevntbrændende Ild, der næres stedse og udbreder en stadig vedligeholdt Varme i Brystet’ 
(1992, 205).
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this a number of chapters present virtues and qualities which above all are 
relevant when at war. Courage, bravery, perseverance, cunning, and justice 
are among them. The final section presents civic virtues like zeal, diligence, 
industry, and charity. Even this can be read as an image or map. However, 
this map does not present the conditions of human existence in a universe 
of divine power, strong forces and enigmatic signs. What Malling’s choice 
of virtues serves to portray is rather the life of a good subject in an absolute 
monarchy. His table of contents informs the reader about the qualities of a 
good citizen, in prioritized order. Readers are instructed to love their king 
and their fatherland. By means of a virtuous life and diligent action, citizens 
are expected to work for the common good as well as for their own salvation. 
Religion is the frame: personal piety is not only praised, but also given pride of 
place as the first chapter of the book. Loyalty to the king – chapter two – has 
its basis in the fact that the king has his power from God. Secular civil society 
is nonetheless the main issue throughout the book. The greatest emphasis – 
in a number of chapters and stories – is put on good patriotic deeds, serving 
the state and the community of citizens. Even kings are presented as good 
citizens or as private individuals. They are wise, noble, and mild. The king 
is portrayed as the father of his house, be it in his affairs with his subjects or 
within his own family.
Human beings in Malling do not spend their lives in the unpredictable 
and at the same time constant span between virtue and fortune. They live in 
quite another world, safely situated in civil society which on the one hand is 
given by God – represented by solid Lutheranism – and on the other hand 
is defined by the absolute state. The agents are also different in Malling. To 
fulfil the promise made in the title, the collection had to include citizens from 
all parts of the realm of the composite Danish-Norwegian monarchy. The 
reader will thus meet persons from Denmark, Iceland, Norway as well as the 
duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. Equally important is the fact that both the 
bourgeois and peasants are represented in addition to the king and nobility. 
There are stories about brave soldiers, heroic clergy, and even the courageous 
Anna Colbjørnsen, wife of the vicar at Norderhov in southern Norway, who 
tricked the Swedes into an ambush during their campaign in 1716. In some 
cases the non-noble agents are anonymous or even represented as groups – 
like ‘a Norwegian’ or ‘the Norwegians’ – but just as often are given individual 
names. Not least does this apply to the chapter about industriousness which 
presents a large number of peasants. Malling got much of his material for 
this chapter from the patriotic societies that flourished in the period. These 
societies awarded prizes for different types of improvements, diligence, and 
useful projects, and supplied him with numerous stories about digging of 
ditches, cultivation of new fields or construction of manure cellars. One such 
story tells about the Norwegian peasant Gunder Haresaas from the Trondheim 
region who ‘built a road that goes over steep hills and deep bogs up to a wide 
mountain valley, Giedaadalen; by means of which he has gained access for 
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himself and his neighbours to an excellent summer pasture for more than 70 
cattle’.13 The peasants Osmund Hustø, Ole Torvig and Jens Gundersen Kulaas 
from the Stavanger region all showed ‘courage and swiftness’ in hunting 
down wolves and bears. A truly magnificent example is the peasant Lars 
Huusbye, also from the Trondheim region. Even though he was a poor man, 
he established and cultivated a large orchard at his farm. He is also reported 
to have carried out other agricultural improvements. This peasant – all by 
himself – studied magazines and literature concerning agriculture, he added 
to them with notes and comments based on his own experience, and offered 
copies of and excerpts from this edifying material to others (1992, 408 ff).
There can be no doubt, then, that in Malling’s view even ordinary citizens 
can be historical agents, in the sense that their deeds have exemplary value. 
Malling is nonetheless explicit that exemplarity is a feature of the deed, not 
of the person who carries it out. He also points out that in order to judge a 
deed, it is the deed that must be examined, not its executor:
one may see Bishops and clergy drawing the sword to defend their country, one may 
see heroes laying down their weapons to live a life in quiet virtue. What is important 
to observe is the deed itself. It shall not be mentioned because of the person behind 
it, but the person because of the deed. This is the reason why one sometimes will 
find the peasant equal to the king, his deeds earn him the place.14
The argument makes it clear that the choice of persons presented in the book 
is not based on democratic ideas about representation. The image presented 
is not one of an egalitarian society. Malling’s intention is to praise those 
who deserve it due to their deeds rather than their position, but in no way to 
suggest that this implies an adjustment or change of positions. The point is 
to underscore that peasants and citizens may ‘equal the king’ because they 
are ennobled by their actions. For this to happen it is fundamental that their 
actions be truly exemplary. When Malling argues that even civic virtue – like 
diligence, industriousness, and zeal – may hold an exemplary quality, he is 
also giving access to the scene of history to persons outside the governing elite.
13 In Danish, ‘opbrudt en Vei igiennem bradt Berg og bløde myrer til en stor Field-Dal, 
Giedaadalen; hvorved han har tilveiebragt sig og sine Naboer en ypperlig Sommer-Drift for 
over 70 Storfæe’ (Malling 1992, 408).
14 In Danish, ‘thi man vil finde Bisper og Præster drage Sværdet og fegte for Fædrenelandet, 
og man vil see Helte nedlægge det og udøve de stille Dyder i roligt Liv. Men her agte man, at 
det er Handlingen, der egentlig sees paa, og at den ikke nævnes for Personens, men Personen 
for Handlingens Skyld. Dette er Aarsagen hvorfor man vil finde Bonden undertiden ved siden 
af Kongen; thi hans Handlinger fortiene at staae der’ (1992, 22).
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6. On Courage
Schefferus and Malling both made structural choices that clearly subordinated 
temporality to exemplarity in their books. Schefferus’ presentation of signs, 
references, and cosmic powers and Malling’s construction of a taxonomy 
of virtues differ considerably from each other. Both do nonetheless create 
frameworks that enhanced the intrinsically atemporal dimension of the virtues 
and deeds that were to be presented. Both embraced the set of virtues in a way 
that gave them the appearance of a stable existence, indisputably independent 
of the more superficial shifts of temporal circumstance. It remains to be 
explored if this atemporal quality of histories is also maintained in the actual 
episodes that are narrated in the two books. To facilitate the examination and 
make comparisons possible, the following discussion will focus on a virtue 
that is given a prominent place in both books: courage.
Malling’s definition of courage is without any temporal dimension and 
without historical specificity. He introduces the virtue in his usual systematic 
way, contrasting true courage with duels and other pretentious fights, which 
do not produce true heroes. Courage, on the other hand, has to do with 
the battles that honour and obligation demand: defending the king and the 
fatherland, doing one’s duty. As duties will vary according to one’s position 
in life, Malling also draws a distinction between courage in common men, 
seen largely as a matter of physical strength, and in leaders, which includes 
strategic capacity (1992, 224). Schefferus for his part introduces the chapter 
on courage with the claim that the Swedes have ‘always’ excelled in this virtue. 
He also says that this virtue is recognized by everybody, quite independently 
of their social standing. The references that follow are not very specific, but 
an informed reader will recognize a compact version of Swedish history in 
the introductory text. The non-temporal ‘always’ is thus made specific by 
means of a roughly chronological presentation, rather than a definition of 
courage as such.
Schefferus’ narratives – or examples, as he calls them– about courage 
are all rather short. They are not presented in chronological order and not 
clearly related to period or circumstance. In some stories, the name of a king 
is mentioned, which indirectly situates the story historically. The same goes 
for the wars that in some cases are given as frames for the reported act of 
courage: the event can be said to have taken place during the war against the 
Danish king Kristian, or during a war in Russia or in Livonia. Readers well 
versed in the events of Swedish history, and particularly that of the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, will understand which campaigns and thus which 
period this refers to. It is nonetheless obvious that such discernment has not 
been regarded as a prerequisite to enjoy – and learn from – the examples. 
The only temporal distinction that is given some relevance can be found in a 
remark that the most ancient narratives (from heathen times) may seem like 
fairy tales and thus be less trustworthy than the more recent ones (Schefferus 
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2005, 128). What gives Schefferus’ chapter on courage its structure is thus 
not time and chronology, but rather the thematic connections that are made. 
Stories about brave kings make one such thematic cluster, stories about 
courageous women who fight like men, and at times even dress like them, 
is another. Not the least important are the stories about brave soldiers and 
common men who possess great physical strength and ability to fight.
All the narratives are short, most of them fill less than a page each. 
They are usually one-episodic and contain little circumstantial information. 
Schefferus’ book presents, as Kristiina Savin has described, ‘dramatic 
moments, colourful details, directly reported speeches and dialogues and 
emphatic partiality’ (2008, 235). When it comes to courage, it is the action 
itself – the fight –that is presented, rather than its circumstances. In this way, 
Schefferus’ narratives are even less historically specific than his introduction. 
The temporal dimension is at best a part of the ‘stage’ where heroic action takes 
place, and courage appears as a quality that is independent of time, agent, 
and circumstance, but fundamentally tied to battle and physical strength.
The narratives about courage in Malling are considerably longer and 
have a more complex structure with many episodes linked together. Some of 
them amount to compact biographies about men known for their courage 
and bravery, for instance about the sixteenth-century naval hero Cort Adeler 
(1992, 247-253). Unlike Schefferus, Malling does not present any stories about 
brave commoners. The protagonists of all his stories are kings, noblemen, or at 
least military officers. There are no women in the chapter on bravery. As was 
the case with Schefferus, all events and episodes are related to war and warlike 
struggle. It is nonetheless by means of setting up contrasts and emphasizing 
differences that Malling, in accordance with his definition of courage, includes 
strategic cunning in this virtue. Some of his stories consequently present military 
leadership and successful strategies rather than the fight itself.
Malling’s stories also contain far more specific details about time, place, 
and circumstance. For some events the exact year is given. There is also 
information, for instance, about the number of ships involved in a battle, or 
the number of men in an army. Moreover, despite Malling’s general remark 
that he will not present his stories in a chronological order (cf. above, p. 190), 
he does so in the chapter on courage. The first story is about the Cimbrians 
– a people held to be ancestors of the modern Danes – and their struggle 
against the Romans in Gaul and northern Italy. After this follow stories 
taken from saga literature, and then from more recent times. The last part 
of the chapter presents episodes about Danes involved in the war of Spanish 
succession. It concludes with some comments that link these persons to the 
ancient Cimbrians, and with the claim that other European peoples have 
‘always’ recognized and admired the bravery of the Danes (1992, 274).
Despite the chronological order and greater specific historical detail, 
even Malling thus ends with a patriotic ‘always’ that very much resembles 
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that of Schefferus. Historical period also becomes more significant in Malling 
than in Schefferus. On the other hand, the choice of a chronological order is 
what excludes Malling from making distinctions between legendary, ancient 
times and a historical ‘presence’ including all of Christian time in the way 
Schefferus does. Most important in the present context is nonetheless that, 
despite the variation in composition, complexity, and historical detail, there 
seems to be little significant difference in the role of time and temporality in 
the two books’ understanding and presentation of courage.
7. Time and Exemplarity
There is no doubt that the narratives in both Schefferus and Malling are presented 
as examples, and history as magistra vitae. How does exemplarity negotiate time 
in these stories? It has been pointed out throughout this article that the temporal 
dimension does not play an important role in the shaping of the stories and 
that time and period are ascribed comparatively little explanatory value. Even 
chronological order is sometimes explicitly set aside to further enhance the 
exemplary value of the collected stories. Nonetheless, not even examples can escape 
temporality, at least not as long as they are part of a narrative. Narrating events 
cannot do without temporality. For a better understanding of what is at stake 
here, a closer look at the nature of examples might prove useful. What are they, 
and how are they made? J.D. Lyons will be our guide here. In his study of the 
rhetoric of example in early modern France and Italy, Lyons defined examples as 
a ‘connection of a general statement or maxim and a local or specific actualization 
of that maxim’ (1989, 5; see also Eriksen et al. 2012). The example is thus:
a dependent statement qualifying a more general and independent statement by naming 
a member of the class established by the general statement. An example cannot exist 
without a) a general statement and b) an indication of its subordinate status. Moreover, 
examples are most frequently used to c) provide clarification of the general statement 
and d) demonstrate the truth of the general statement. (Lyons 1989, x)
This structure can easily be identified in the two books studied here. In 
both cases, the narratives contained in the books are emphatically presented 
as relating to the general statement or class – the respective virtues. The 
relationship is clearly of a hierarchical kind, making the stories depend on 
the general statement for their full meaning and message. It may also be 
argued that Malling tends to use his examples mainly to clarify the general 
statements. His stories serve to illuminate the systematic definitions that are 
presented in the introductions. His narratives flesh out the definitions and 
make them more easily comprehensible. Schefferus, for his part, tends to 
use the narratives more to demonstrate the truth of his general statement, as 
when he starts by saying that the Swedes have always excelled in this or that 
virtue and then presents stories to prove it.
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An implication of the description given by Lyons is that examples are 
defined by the structural relation between the statement and the instantiation 
or case. This relation itself has a temporal dimension. One of the conventions 
for giving examples is the explicit combination of a general rule, usually 
given in the present tense, and a specific historical event, which usually is 
presented in the past tense (1989, 26). This pattern is followed by both the 
authors investigated here, in the sense that their introductions to each chapter, 
presenting the virtue to be exemplified, is written in the present tense, and 
the following stories in the past.
Lyons also points out that ‘when used in an example, an entity loses its 
autonomy and unicity’, because ‘occurrences and events in examples not only 
can but must be both themselves and representative of something else – of 
the subordinating concept – and must be replaceable in that function with 
other events or entities’ (28). An example, then, is not just any narrative, but 
one ‘with a claim to particular form of truth’ – that which is given by the 
relationship of a general class to a particular instance (12).
At the same time, the instantiation, when it is narrative, will also have 
a temporal structure of its own. This creates the ambivalence that has been 
observed in the histories presented by Schefferus and Malling. As narrative 
units each of them presents the reported events in the temporal order required 
by the plot of the story. To some degree, as we have seen, this even involves 
a more extensive historical chronology represented by the names and reigns 
of kings, the duration of wars and military campaigns and so on. If this 
historical temporality should come to dominate, however, the stories would 
no longer be replaceable and work as examples or instantiations of a general 
statement or value. Their relation to the overall statement would be broken 
and their exemplarity dissolve.
The replaceability of examples reveals – or claims to reveal – an identity 
of events, figures, and even plots across chronological borders. In this way, 
replaceability not only relates the single example to the general statement 
by placing it in a subordinate position. It also relates the example directly 
to other examples of the same general truth, claiming them all to be ‘of the 
same kind’ and equal to each other. They are linked in a way that cuts across 
time and specific circumstance, that cuts across history in its modern sense. 
According to Lyons,
the importance accorded the temporal orders is paradoxically linked to the way 
example allows an act or object to reappear at different periods and thus to defeat 
change. If an exemplum / copy can allow the past not only to be alluded to or reflected 
upon, but actually resuscitated, then time itself can be subordinated to a higher, 
more powerful order. (1989, 11-12)
In Schefferus and Malling it is obvious that the system of virtues itself 
represents a higher order than that of historical chronology. The historical 
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time of the actual narratives, both as single units and as a collection, is 
subordinated by this order. This is nonetheless done in different ways in the 
two books, and the order in question appears to be of two different kinds. 
Schefferus presents his collection in the guise of a ‘grand narrative’ about 
the will of God and the strength of powers like fate, chance, and luck. This 
is what frames his stories about virtue and human achievement, gives them 
their ultimate meaning and serves to position them within a higher order. It 
is from this order that the individual stories get their true meaning, and it is 
also this order that eclipses historical time. In Malling, the individual stories 
are written into a higher order of a different kind. It does not produce a grand 
narrative and it is not in itself temporal. The order presented by Malling is 
simply systematic. This can be seen in the Linnaean introductions to each 
chapter. The nature of each virtue is suspended in a network of identities and 
differences: Malling explains what the virtue is and what it is not. It can also 
be discerned in the overall structure of his book, which does not present a 
cosmic drama in the way Schefferus does, but rather appears as a systematic 
table – again comparable to those of Linnaeus – in which all items get their 
true meaning from the relations they are part of.
The two books that have been examined here were written largely for 
the same purpose. Both are textbooks intended for young people, and based 
on the general idea of history as the teacher of life, as a collection of useful 
examples to learn from. They do not claim to be works of great historical 
erudition, and do not enter into any of the debates current among the learned 
history-writers of their times. Despite their unpretentiousness and the relative 
simplicity implied by their genre, this investigation has shown them to differ 
quite significantly from each other in the ways they make use of the topos of 
history as magistra vitae. It has also proved the fruitfulness of using this kind 
of material to gain a more advanced understanding of the cultural implications 
of the topos, and the ways in which it could be made to work.
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